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All Names Are Not Equal: Choice of Marital Surname 
and Equal Protection 
Kelly Snyder 
INTRODUCTION 
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other word would smell as sweet. 
—William Shakespeare1 
With all respect to Mr. Shakespeare, names matter. One‘s name is 
closely associated with self-identity, and serves the practical function 
of identification by friends, family, businesses, and the government. 
People generally are closely tied to their names, shown in part by the 
great consideration many parents give in naming their children. 
Names are often changed to reflect different life events or statuses—
such as a marrying woman adopting the last name of her new 
husband. 
For a long time, marriage has signaled a joining of two (or more) 
people for the foreseeable future. The motivations to marry, the 
meanings behind it, and the roles of those involved have transformed 
over time.  
It has long been the general practice in the United States for 
women to change their surnames upon marriage. Currently, women 
have the statutory right in all fifty states to change their last name 
upon marriage.
2
 Such a right for marrying men exists in only eight 
states.
3
 In the remaining forty-two states, a husband who wishes to 
take his wife‘s last name or some other last name must obtain a court 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2.  
 2. Infra note 43. 
 3. Infra note 40. 
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order, which can cost hundreds of dollars. Further, there is no 
guarantee that the court will permit the man to change his name. A 
marrying man not only has to consider the extra time and hassle it 
will take to change his last name, but also the stringent social 
pressures against this result. There well could be a lifetime of 
confusion, questions, and assaults on masculinity for the husband 
who takes his wife‘s last name. This is not really a choice at all. 
The same can be said for women. Although women may keep 
their own last names or ―choose‖ to take their husbands‘, the truth is 
that they, too, face generally accepted societal norms against doing 
anything but adopting their husbands‘ last names. This—
compounded by the lack of a statutory right for men to change their 
names in most states—renders women‘s ―choice‖ more like a forced 
result.  
The fact that men do not have the same statutory right as women 
to change their surnames upon marriage is a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection violation. There is no compelling governmental 
interest in denying equal name-changing rights to men, making the 
lack of such statutes unconstitutional. Furthermore, the fact that men 
lack such statutory rights makes it more likely that they will not 
change their name upon marriage. If a married couple wishes to share 
a last name, then, the woman must change hers. Beyond its 
constitutional implications, this has the broader effect of decreasing 
women‘s agency in name choice.  
The solution to men‘s equal protection problems is simple: every 
state should adopt statutes that present marrying men and women 
with truly equal opportunities to change their surnames. Not only will 
this provide men with an easier way to change their last names, but 
the existence of such statutes is a tacit endorsement by the states that 
such name change is a valid decision. Such statutes will encourage 
more couples to consider which—if either, or both—of the partners 
should change his or her last name. In so doing, the decision to 
change one‘s last name becomes more of a choice, and less of a 
forced result based on history and social coercion. Personal agency of 
this sort is especially important for women, who have historically 
been subsumed by their husbands‘ legal identities. 
Part I of this Note recounts the history of women‘s lack of 
autonomy in marriage, the history of marital name-change, and the 
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establishment of intermediate scrutiny as the constitutional test under 
which gender-based equal protection issues are analyzed. Part II of 
this Note analyzes the lack of men‘s statutory right in most states to 
change their last names upon marriage through the lens of 
intermediate scrutiny and concludes that there is an equal protection 
violation. Part II further analyzes why a majority of marrying women 
adopt their husbands‘ surnames, and asserts that marrying men‘s 
relative inability to change their surnames has the negative effect of 
further restricting women‘s agency, in that the ―choice‖ marrying 
women have in changing their surnames resembles more of a coerced 
decision. Part III of this Note reviews statutes of the eight states in 
which men possess a statutory right to change their last names upon 
marriage, and proposes that all states adopt similar statutes that not 
only grant marrying men and women the same processes for 
changing their last names, but also eliminate the discriminatory 
language found in existing statutes. 
I. HISTORY 
A. Women’s Lack of Autonomy in Marriage and the Common Law 
Under the common law, when a woman married a man
4
 she was 
deprived of independent legal existence; her legal identity merged 
with that of her husband.
5
 This was called coverture, and the wife 
was termed a feme covert, because the identity of the wife was 
―covered‖ by the husband.6 Essentially, husband and wife were 
regarded as one, and that one was the husband.
7
  
Through marriage, a husband had a duty to support his wife 
financially and represent her in the legal system.
8
 The husband gained 
 
 4. This Note deals with name change in the context of marriage between a man and a 
woman. There is no consideration of similar issues for same-sex marriages or unions, although 
some of the arguments in this Note may apply to such arrangements. For further reference, see 
Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital 
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 783, 789–91 (2007). 
 5. See id. at 771; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 367 (3d ed. 1993). 
 6. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 367. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 983 n.101 (2002). 
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rights to most property the wife brought into the marriage, and to her 
paid and unpaid labor.
9
 He could even be held liable for some of her 
crimes.
10
 The wife, by contrast, could neither contract, nor appear in 
court, nor have seisin of land except through her husband.
11
 She was 
also required to serve and obey him.
12
 
Clearly a gendered hierarchy in marriage existed at common law 
that held husbands above wives. This kind of discrimination based on 
sex has been perpetuated through judicial decision-making, statutes, 
and government regulations.
13
 In the marriage context, this hierarchy 
and discrimination has been manifested through courts and 
legislatures legally assigning a married woman her husband‘s 
surname, often citing common law as authority.
14
 These stereotypical 
notions of marital roles and relationships persist today first through 
social discrimination against wives who choose not to assume their 
husbands‘ last names, and second through legal and social 
discrimination against husbands who desire to take their wives‘ last 
names.
15
 
B. Marital Name Change 
Although Hawaii was the only state to explicitly require married 
women to ―adopt the names of their husbands as a family name,‖16 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.’s Law 
Commonplace (1763), 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 346 (2007). 
 12. Siegel, supra note 8, at 983. 
 13. For example, a woman could not vote until 1920 and a woman did not win an equal 
protection lawsuit against a state until 1971. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–32 (1996) (citing cases). 
 14. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 221 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (recognizing 
Alabama‘s adoption of a common law rule providing that the wife takes the husband‘s surname 
at marriage); In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (refusing to naturalize a 
woman under her birth surname); Pay Role Signature—Married Women Employees, 4 Comp. 
Gen. 165 (1924) (requiring married female federal government employees to use their 
husbands‘ surnames on the payroll); Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) 
(construing common law to require married women to use their husbands‘ surnames). 
 15. See discussion infra Parts I.C, II. 
 16. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1 (1968). Hawaii was the only state to ever statutorily require 
women to change their last names to their husbands‘ upon marriage. This was apparently for 
reasons of westernization, and the law has since been superseded. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/17
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women were effectively subject to a mandatory regime of name 
change at marriage until about thirty years ago.
17
 This is contrary to 
common law, where women and men were free to change their 
surnames through common usage.
18
 For married women, who were 
treated as feme coverts, bearing their husbands‘ surnames was a 
matter of custom and not legal command. 
This custom transformed into law through the cumulative dicta of 
multiple cases in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.
19
 
Such cases
20
 taken together declared that a married woman‘s right to 
participate in activities such as driving or voting depended upon her 
bearing her husband‘s surname.21 This situation persisted until the 
1970s, when courts began holding that women had the right to retain 
their birth names after marriage.
22
 
 
1 (1993 & Supp. 2004) (allowing for choice in marital naming); Emens, supra note 4, at 772 
n.31 (noting the ―westernization‖ rationale). 
 17. See Emens, supra note 4, at 772 (noting that the mandatory name change regime 
―largely continued until the 1970s, when a series of cases established the right of women to 
continue to bear their birthnames after marriage‖). 
 18. See UNA STANNARD, MRS MAN 112, 115 (Germainbooks 1977) (recognizing that at 
common law, surnames did not require court approval for change, but had ―original 
mutability‖); Emens, supra note 4, at 770–71. 
 19. ―The foundational dicta came from Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 
449 (1881), a case involving an overzealous wartime action to confiscate property.‖ Emens, 
supra note 4, at 772 n.29. The court set aside the action to confiscate, finding that improper 
notice of forfeiture was given because it was in the married woman‘s birth name. Id. In so 
doing, the court noted that ―[f]or several centuries, by the common law among all English 
speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her husband‘s surname.‖ Chapman, 85 
N.Y. at 449. Of course, this was incorrect; this supposed ―common law‖ was merely custom. 
Emens, supra note 4, at 772 n.29. 
 20. Or statutes, in the case of Hawaii. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 647 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) (interpreting a state 
statute to mandate that a woman‘s voter registration in her birth name is automatically cancelled 
upon marriage, and that she must re-register in her married name in order to vote); Bacon v. 
Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 152 N.E. 35, 36 (Mass. 1926) (invalidating registration of automobile 
in married woman‘s birth surname rather than husband‘s surname); Appeal of Hanson, 198 A. 
113, 114 (Pa. 1938) (sanctioning refusal by Board of Law Examiners to admit married women 
to the Bar in their birth surname); STANNARD, supra note 18, at 239–61 (stating that in 1971, 
the United States Department of State officially decreed that ―[t]he legal name of a married 
woman is her husband‘s surname,‖ and refused to issue passports to married women in their 
birth surname). 
 22. See, e.g., Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688–89 (Tenn. 1975) (finding that 
neither custom nor law requires that a woman change her name to her husband‘s at marriage, 
and thus the plaintiff‘s name was wrongly purged from the voter rolls when she declined to re-
register in her husband‘s name); Kruzel v. Podell, 226 N.W.2d 458, 463–66 (Wis. 1975) 
(holding that a woman‘s name does not change to her husband‘s on marriage if she consistently 
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Today, the vast majority of marrying women change their 
surnames to their husbands‘ even though this is not legally required.23 
The vast majority of marrying men do not change their surnames.
24
 
This can be attributed largely to social norms, pressures, and legal 
defaults.
25
 
In most states, the easiest legal course of action—the legal 
―default‖—is for a woman to keep her birth name.26 Despite this 
 
used her maiden name); Emens, supra note 4, at 772 n.32; Claudia Goldin & Maria Shim, 
Making a Name: Women’s Surnames at Marriage and Beyond, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 144–45 
(2004) (discussing the legal changes in marital names in the 1970s). 
 23. The actual percentage of women changing their names upon marriage is difficult to 
determine. One poll indicates that only 10% of married women in the United States do not have 
their husbands‘ birth name as their married last name. Joan Brightman, Why Hillary Chooses 
Rodham Clinton, 16 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 9, 9 (1994) (citing a poll conducted by NRF 
Research Inc. for American Demographics in 1993). A study by sociologists who have studied 
the phenomenon of name-changing for over twenty-five years reports that fewer than 5% of 
women over two generations did anything other than take their husbands‘ names at marriage, 
though the older sample excluded women who had divorced during a relevant twelve-year 
window. Laurie K. Scheuble & David R. Johnson, Women’s Marital Naming in Two 
Generations: A National Study, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 724, 727 (1995). This suggests that 
the 5% figure may be lower than the general rate in the population. Emens, supra note 4, at 785 
n.82. Yet another study asserts that the percentage of women college graduates in the United 
States keeping their own surnames upon marriage rose from 2 to 4% in 1975 to just below 20% 
in 2001. Goldin & Shim, supra note 22, at 144–45 n.32. The Goldin & Shim study compared 
Harvard alumnae records, Massachusetts birth records, and wedding announcements published 
in the New York Times. Id. at 143. Goldin & Shim concluded that graduation from an Ivy 
League or top-25 liberal arts college corresponded with an eleven percentage point increase in 
1991 and a fourteen percentage point increase in 2001, which suggests that the 20% figure 
given for 2001 is too high for the general populace. Id. at 156. No matter which study one 
reads, marrying women who choose not to change their names upon marriage are in the 
minority. See Emens, supra note 4, at 785–89, for a more in-depth discussion of these and other 
studies and trends regarding women‘s marital name-change. 
 24. This can be inferred not only from common experience, but also from the Goldin & 
Shim and Scheuble & Johnson studies regarding marrying women changing their names. See 
supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. Of course, if marrying women and marrying men 
both are changing their names upon marriage—perhaps by switching last names—then the 
studies of marrying women‘s name-change suggests nothing at all about men changing their 
name. Again, this possibility is largely refuted by everyday experience with married couples 
and their last names. 
 25. For a broad discussion on the motivations of women and men in changing their names 
upon marriage, see Emens, supra note 4. 
 26. Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota invite parties 
to state their postmarital names on their marriage license application form, and thus compel a 
kind of forced choosing. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-33.1 (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.5 
(West 2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 1D (LexisNexis 1991); MINN. STAT. § 517.08 
(2005); N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 15 (McKinney 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/17
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being the easiest legal position, very few women keep their birth 
names at marriage.
27
 To not become ―Mrs. His Name‖28 might mean 
fewer legal hurdles, but it also means stronger social opposition.
29
 
Departing from the convention of women changing their names 
might feel like the loss of something expected.
30
 ―Keeping‖ is also 
perceived as more of an active choice, because changing the 
husband‘s name is rarely mentioned, and any children almost always 
take the husband‘s name.31 Furthermore, women who choose to keep 
their own birth names may encounter confusion or prejudice about 
their decision.
32
 Despite keeping being the easiest option legally, the 
choice for marrying women that has the fewest costs both legally and 
socially is Mrs. His Name.
33
 
 
20.1 (1996). This means that the legal default in those states is not precisely a woman keeping 
her name. See Emens, supra note 4, at 812. 
 27. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 28. ―Mrs. His Name‖ has been used before. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 4, at 764; Jean 
M. Twenge, “Mrs. His Name”: Women’s Preferences for Married Names, 21 PSYCH. WOMEN 
Q. 417, 425 (1997). 
 29. For example, an article by Peggy Noonan that celebrates the increasing numbers of 
women who take their husbands‘ surnames implicitly rebukes women who do otherwise as not 
sufficiently dedicated to martial unity: ―A bride [who] grew up in the Age of Divorce. . . . may 
have fewer misconceptions than [her] parents about how important freedom and self-
actualization are. [She] may think other things are more important, like constancy and 
commitment and loyalty.‖ Peggy Noonan, Looking Forward, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1996, 
at 208; see also Emens, supra note 4, at 814 (recognizing that the legal default of ―keeping‖ 
may not be the actual result for most women ―in light of the strong social conventions in this 
area‖). 
 30. Emens, supra note 4, at 813–14. In finding that women do not keep their own birth 
names upon marriage, Emens posits three potential causes: (1) women may experience loss 
aversion, making them reluctant to depart from the status quo; (2) women may want to avoid 
the effort of making a decision, either through laziness or through some desire not to be actively 
responsible for their decisions; and (3) women may interpret a default as a suggestion or 
recommendation from some better informed or authoritative entity. Id.  
 31. Id. at 814. 
 32. It is difficult to discern whether and to what degree women who keep their own 
surnames upon marriage encounter confusion or prejudice. Recent studies indicate that women 
who keep their birth names are thought by others to be more assertive, more feminist, and more 
oriented toward their careers than their families. See id. at 779 n.56 (listing studies). Whether 
these labels are positive or negative does not matter so much as the fact that they may not be 
true; such assumptions often prove unwarranted and unappreciated. In times past, the ―label 
commonly affixed to women who have chosen to retain their own names upon marriage is that 
of mentally instable or insane.‖ Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem that Has No Name, 4 
CARDOZO WOMEN‘S L.J. 321, 397 (1998). 
 33. Emens, supra note 4, at 817. 
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Even though becoming Mrs. His Name is the ―easiest‖ option for 
women socially, it is not a simple task. A marrying woman who 
wants to assume her husband‘s surname must complete forms and 
send a copy of the marriage license to the Social Security 
Administration, the state department of vehicles, the state voter 
registration bureau, and the United States Passport Agency.
34
 This is 
only the beginning, as credit cards, mailing addresses, bank accounts, 
insurance policies, leases, and titles to property may need to be 
altered as well.
35
 
For men, keeping their birth names at marriage is the easiest 
legally and socially. Keeping for men is the social norm; it is 
expected.
36
 Unlike wives, however, the vast majority of husbands 
actually keep their names.
37
 If a man wanted to become Mr. Her 
Name, the process would be far more daunting both socially and 
legally than for a woman wishing to become Mrs. His Name. 
Socially, men face intense questioning and taunting.
38
 Legally, men 
 
 34. See KitBiz, Official New Bride Name Change Kit, http://www.kitbiz.com (reporting 
that no changes need to be made with tax entities, as the Social Security notification suffices). 
Also sold on this website is a name-change kit for the bride and groom who each want to take 
both surnames. Id. For example, Woman A and Man B could become Woman A B and Man A 
B. 
 35. See Karen Jansen, Play the Name-Change Game, WYOMING TRIBUNE-EAGLE, June 4, 
2000 (listing some of the factors to consider when changing one‘s name upon marriage, 
including the multiple entities that must be informed of the change). 
 36. A man grows up ―knowing from a young age that his name is his to keep. . . . For him 
to do anything other than keep his own name . . . is likely to meet even harsher and more 
uniform criticism.‖ Emens, supra note 4, at 778–81. 
 37. See id. at 785. Evidence for this statement includes common experience, but also the 
studies of women‘s name change, which show that the majority of marrying women adopt their 
husbands‘ last names. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 38. See, e.g., Steve Friess, Post-Wedding Names Get New Look, WZZM 13 NEWS, Mar. 
21, 2007, http://www.wzzm13.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=72829. Sam Van Hallgren, 
co-host of the movie-review podcast Filmspotting, was formerly Sam Hallgren until he married 
Carrie Van Deest. Id. They combined their last names to create ―Van Hallgren.‖ Id. Sam 
received a note from a listener instructing Sam to ―turn in [his] man card,‖ and asked what 
―sissy juice‖ the host was drinking. Id. The note was not a lone instance of social backlash; Sam 
had to explain himself to the rest of his listeners and even his co-host. Id. Similarly, Mike 
Salinger—birth name Mike Davis—took his wife‘s last name upon marriage. Id. The guests at 
their own wedding were confused and disbelieving, and his college roommate still chides him 
months later. Id. As Sharon Naylor, an author of wedding-themed books, notes, if a groom is 
considering hyphenating or changing his name, there exists an omnipresent concern of ―What 
will the people think at the office? What will my father think?‖ Id. See also Jodi Rudoren, Meet 
Our New Name, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 9, at 3 (recounting comments to her husband after 
they merged their last names, including, ―It appears that married life has literally taken the man 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/17
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have the statutory right to change their names upon marriage in only 
eight states.
39
 In the remaining states, men must obtain a court order 
to change their names for any reason, including marriage.
40
 Such a 
court order generally requires going to court, paying court fees that 
can be hundreds of dollars, and putting an advertisement in the local 
paper.
41
 This does not guarantee that a marrying man will be able to 
change his name, however, as the decision is then left to the 
discretion of a judge.
42
 A woman, on the other hand, has the right 
either to take her husband‘s surname or retain her birth name upon 
marriage in all fifty states.
43
  
The statutes enabling a man to change his name upon marriage in 
California, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New 
 
out of you‖); Jeanne Phillips, Dear Abby: Man Takes Wife’s Name Despite His Mother’s 
Threat, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 5, 2005, at 2D (asking when and how to tell the 
husband‘s mother that he took his wife‘s name, in light of his mother‘s threat to disown him if 
he did so); Lou Gonzales, Man Finds Resistance to Name Change, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 10, 
2000, at D2 (describing the reaction of the person in charge of name changes in military records 
as ―[n]o dice . . . . ‗You‘re the man. You‘re the man of the house‘‖). 
 39. Those states are California, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New 
York, and North Dakota. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2008) (providing the guidelines for 
petitioning to have a name change). 
 41. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1277–1278 (2006), which no longer apply to 
marrying men due to the recent Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Assemb. B. 102 (Oct. 12, 
2007). Under the old statutory regime, an individual who sought a name change had to file a 
petition with a court, publish notice of the application in a newspaper of general circulation, and 
appear in court to obtain approval. Court fees required for this process were in excess of $300. 
See, e.g., California Political Desk, Governor Signs Landmark Name Change Legislation, CAL. 
CHRON., Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID 
=40179. Illinois charges a man wishing to take his wife‘s surname $246 for a petition and 
another $150 to publish the change in a newspaper; Connecticut charges $150 for a court 
petition. Michael Rittner, Man Fights to Take Wife’s Name in Marriage, L.A. INDEP. MEDIA 
CENTER, Jan. 13, 2007, http://la.indymedia.org/news/2007/01/191537.php. California recently 
changed its marriage name-change statute to permit an equal name-change process for marrying 
men, women, and domestic partners. Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Assemb. B. 102 (Oct. 
12, 2007).  
 42. Michael Rosensaft, Comment, The Right of Men to Change Their Names upon 
Marriage, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 186, 193–94 (2002). Rosensaft notes that six states give total 
discretion to their courts to decide whether to grant a name change, using phrases like ―what a 
court shall deem right and proper.‖ Id. at 193 n.39. An additional eleven states give almost total 
discretion to their courts, applying vague standards such as ―if not against the public interest‖ or 
―for good reasons shown.‖ Id. at 194 n.41.  
 43. See, e.g., Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 
LAW & INEQ. 91, 96 n.9 (1985). 
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York, and North Dakota are basically uniform in that they allow 
marrying men to change their names like marrying women.
44
 Most of 
 
 44. Excerpts of the name-change statutes of those states follow in pertinent part. Large 
portions of many of the statutes have been cut for simplicity and efficiency.  
 California:  
 Section 306.5 is added to the Family Code to read: 
(a) Parties to a marriage shall not be required to have the same name. Neither party 
shall be required to change his or her name. A person‘s name shall not change upon 
marriage unless that person elects to change his or her name pursuant to subdivision 
(b).  
(b)(1) One party or both parties to a marriage may elect to change the middle or last 
names by which that party wishes to be known after solemnization of the marriage by 
entering the new name in the spaces provided on the marriage license application 
without intent to defraud. 
(2) A person may adopt any of the following middle or last names pursuant to 
paragraph (1): 
(A) The current last name of the other spouse. 
(B) The last name of either spouse given at birth. 
(C) A name combining into a single last name all or a segment of the current last name 
or the last name of either spouse given at birth. 
(D) A hyphenated combination of last names. 
(3) (A) An election by a person to change his or her name pursuant to paragraph (1) 
shall serve as a record of the name change. A certified copy of a marriage certificate 
containing the new name, or retaining the former name, shall constitute proof that the 
use of the new name or retention of the former name is lawful.  
Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Assemb. B. 102, sec. 7 (codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 306.5 
(2009)). 
  Georgia:  
A spouse may use as a legal surname his or her: (1) Given surname or, in the event the 
given surname has been changed as provided in Chapter 12 of this title, the surname so 
changed; (2) Surname from a previous marriage ; (3) Spouse‘s surname; or (4) 
Surname as provided in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection in conjunction with the 
surname of the other spouse.  
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-33.1 (1999). 
  
 Hawaii:  
Upon marriage each of the parties to a marriage shall declare the middle and last 
names each will use as a married person. The last name or names chosen may be any 
middle or last name legally used at any time, past or present, by either spouse, or any 
combination of such names, which may, but need not, be separated by a hyphen.  
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574-1 (LexisNexis 1993). 
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 Iowa:  
A party may indicate on the application for a marriage license the adoption of a name 
change. The names used on the marriage license shall become the legal names of the 
parties to the marriage. The marriage license shall contain a statement that when a 
name change is requested and affixed to the marriage license, the new name is the 
legal name of the requesting party.  
IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.5 (West 2001). 
 Louisiana:  
―Marriage does not change the name of either spouse. However, a married person may 
use the surname of either or both spouses as a surname.‖ LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 
(2002). 
 Massachusetts:  
―[A] party to a marriage may adopt any surname, including but not limited to the 
present or birth-given surname of either party, may retain or resume use of a present or 
birth-given surname, or may adopt any hyphenated combination thereof.‖ GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 46, § 1D (West 2008). 
 New York:  
(b) Every application for a marriage license shall contain a statement to the following 
effect:  
NOTICE TO APPLICANTS 
 (1) Every person has the right to adopt any name by which he or she wishes to be 
known simply by using that name consistently and without intent to defraud. 
 (2) A person‘s last name (surname) does not automatically change upon marriage, 
and neither party to the marriage must change his or her last name. Parties to a 
marriage need not have the same last name. 
 (3) One or both parties to a marriage may elect to change the surname . . . after the 
solemnization of the marriage by entering a new name in the space below. Such entry 
shall consist of one of the following surnames: 
(i) the surname of the other spouse; or 
(ii) any former surname of either spouse; or 
(iii) a name combining into a single surname all or a segment of the premarriage 
surname or any former surname of each spouse; or 
(iv) a combination name separated by a hyphen, provided that each part of such 
combination surname is the premarriage surname, or any former surname, of each 
spouse. 
 (4) The use of this option will have the effect of providing a record of the change of 
name. The marriage certificate, containing the new name, if any, constitutes proof that 
the use of the new name, or the retention of the former name, is lawful. 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2003). 
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the statutes allow husbands and wives to keep their own surnames, 
adopt the last names of their spouses, or hyphenate their last names.
45
 
California also allows domestic partners to adopt each others‘ last 
names.
46
 
 
North Dakota:  
1. Every person has the right to adopt any surname by which that person wishes to be 
known by using that surname consistently and without intent to defraud.  
2. A person‘s surname does not automatically change upon marriage. Neither party to 
the marriage must change the party‘s surname. Parties to a marriage need not have the 
same surname.  
3. One party or both parties to the marriage may elect to change the surname by which 
that party wishes to be known after the solemnization of the marriage by entering the 
new surname on the space provided on the marriage license application. The entry on 
the application must consist of one of the following surnames:  
a. The surname of the other spouse;  
b. Any former surname of either spouse;  
c. A name combining into a single surname all or a segment of the premarriage 
surname or any former surname of either spouse; or 
d. A combination name separated by a hyphen, provided that each part of the 
combination surname is the premarriage surname or former surname of either spouse. 
4. Use of the option under subsection 3 has the effect of providing a record of the 
surname change. The marriage certificate containing the new surname, if any, 
constitutes proof that the use of the new surname, or the retention of the former 
surname, is lawful.  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-20.1 (1996). 
 45. As Emens points out, however, the fact that the statutes give equal name-changing 
prerogative to men and women does not in fact mean that the statutes are written in a gender-
neutral way. See Emens, supra note 4, at 854–61. Georgia‘s marriage forms, for example, still 
have a space for a woman‘s ―maiden name,‖ but no similar space for a man‘s birth name, which 
suggests a state norm of women being the parties who change their names upon marriage. See 
THEODORE R. SMITH, APPLICATION FOR MARRIAGE LICENSE, 5 GA. PLEADING, PRACTICE & 
LEGAL FORMS § 19-3-33 Form 1 (3d ed. 2007). 
 The choice of the word ―maiden‖ versus ―birth name‖ may itself implicate gender-specific 
expectations and norms, but the lack of a space for a man‘s birth name, regardless of what it 
should be called, suggests a state norm of women changing their names.  
 46. See Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Assemb. B. 102 (Oct. 12, 2007). As amended, 
section 298(d) of the Family Code provides in part that ―[t]he Declaration of Domestic 
Partnership form shall contain an optional section for either party or both parties to indicate a 
change in name pursuant to Section 298.6.‖ Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Assemb. B. 102, 
§ 4 (codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 298.6 (2009)). Section 298.6 provides a name change option 
upon registration as domestic partners identical to that for marrying couples, substituting the 
words ―domestic partners‖ where necessary. Id. 
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C. Gender Discrimination and Equal Protection Under the 
Constitution 
Three constitutional principles are implicated when dealing with 
the right of a man to change his name upon marriage: (1) equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment;
47
 (2) freedom of 
expression under the First Amendment;
48
 and (3) privacy rights 
implicit in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
49
 This 
Note assesses whether it is unconstitutional, on equal protection 
grounds, to allow a marrying woman to change her surname without 
allowing a marrying man to change his surname through the same 
process.  
Gender discrimination cases challenged on equal protection 
grounds are analyzed through the lens of intermediate scrutiny.
50
 To 
satisfy intermediate scrutiny, ―classification by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives.‖51 Sex-based classification 
resulting in ―differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which 
relief is sought‖ can be supported only by an ―exceedingly 
persuasive‖ justification.52 Regardless of whether women or men are 
disadvantaged, any gender classification must meet the intermediate 
scrutiny standard.
53
 This standard applies both to facially 
 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 49. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, and IX; see Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) 
(finding that a right to personal privacy is not explicitly found in the Constitution, but roots of 
that right can be found in the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth amendments in varying contexts). 
All three potential constitutional issues are noted by Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 186, 195, 207, 
211. See Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., concurring) (―The 
question could well be analyzed as a First Amendment issue. What I call myself or my child is 
an aspect of speech. When the State says I cannot call my child what I want to call her, my 
freedom of expression, both oral and written, is lessened.‖); Margaret Eve Spencer, A Woman's 
Right to Her Name, 21 UCLA L. REV. 665, 684 (1973) (arguing that a married woman who 
wishes to keep her birth name is generally making a statement that she rejects certain aspects of 
the traditional female role or stereotype). 
 50. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The Supreme Court 
established this standard in Craig v. Boren. Id. at 210 (finding an Oklahoma statute that 
permitted women to purchase beer at a younger age than men to be unconstitutional under the 
equal protection clause). 
 51. Id. at 197. 
 52. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
 53. Craig v. Boren itself was a challenge involving a statute discriminating against men. 
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discriminatory statutes and statutes that are facially neutral but 
discriminatory in effect.
54
 Statutes regarding marital name-change 
classify affected parties according to sex, resulting in differential 
treatment; they are facially discriminatory, as they apply only to 
marrying women, and thus intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.
55
 At 
the very least, the statutes are effectively discriminatory because 
women are the only ones permitted to change their names pursuant to 
them.
56
 
What would constitute an ―important governmental interest,‖ as 
required by intermediate scrutiny? Only one federal case in 
California has dealt directly with denial of a man‘s equal protection 
right in changing his name upon marriage.
57
 This case was settled 
without a decision on the merits.
58
 Other analogous cases illuminate 
the right of women to retain their names upon marriage, the right of 
 
429 U.S. at 210. Although Justice Rehnquist found this troubling in his dissent, later cases re-
affirmed the principle that discrimination against men or women must meet the intermediate 
scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―Most obviously unavailable 
to support any kind of special scrutiny in this case, is a history or pattern of past discrimination 
[against men]. . . .‖); cf. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) 
(using intermediate scrutiny to analyze a statute making men alone criminally liable for 
statutory rape); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210–11 (1977) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a statute that automatically paid survivor benefits to widows, but paid them to a 
widower only if he had been receiving at least half of his support from his wife). 
 54. The text being facially neutral has not supported a Fourteenth Amendment argument 
when the statute plainly has a discriminatory effect or is administered in a discriminatory 
fashion. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1967) (―The mere fact of equal application 
does not mean that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in 
cases involving no racial discrimination . . . . There can be no question but that Virginia‘s 
miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race.‖). 
 55. Rosensaft, agreeing that intermediate scrutiny applies, also notes that statutes covering 
name change upon divorce are facially discriminatory. Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 196–97.  
 56. This is the position adopted by Rosensaft. Id. at 195. 
 57. Buday v. California, No. 2:06-CV-08008, 2007 DOCK-CA-CDCT WL (C.D. Cal. 
filed Dec. 15, 2006). Plaintiff Buday is a man who was denied the right to change his surname 
to that of his wife upon marriage. Id. Buday asserted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex 
and a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as denial of his 
fundamental right to personal identity and autonomy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007). Id.; see 
also infra notes 58, 108. 
 58. Plaintiff Michael Buday and his wife, Diana Bijon, reached a settlement with the 
California Department of Motor Vehicles and Department of Health Services to allow Buday to 
take his wife‘s last name, officially becoming Michael Bijon. Press Release, ACLU of Southern 
California, ACLU/SC and Partners Win Settlement in Equal Rights Fight for a Husband to 
Adopt His Wife‘s Surname (May 5, 2008), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/releases/view/ 
102870; see also supra note 39 and infra note 108. 
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parents to name their children, and the right of children to bear a 
surname different from their fathers.
59
 In such cases, the government 
has or could have asserted the following interests: custom, 
preservation of the family unit, administrative convenience, 
prevention of fraud, or de minimis injury.
60
 These potential 
governmental interests (de minimis injury being more of a potential 
argument than an interest) must also be ―substantially related‖ to the 
state‘s objectives in not providing equal name-change rights to 
marrying men and women.
61
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Equal Protection Under the Constitution 
The potential governmental interests involved in not permitting 
husbands to change their names statutorily like wives include custom, 
preservation of the family unit, administrative convenience, 
prevention of fraud, and de minimis injury.
62
 
The argument for custom as a sufficiently important governmental 
interest is that because men historically have not changed their 
surnames upon marriage, there has never been a need for a statute 
permitting such a name-change, and thus there is no reason to change 
the status quo.
63
 Custom itself does not present a compelling 
argument because ―[t]o subject different groups to disparate treatment 
because society historically has done so undermines the very purpose 
of equal protection.‖64 If custom controlled equal protection issues, 
 
 59. See O‘Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (striking down a statute 
forcing a child to bear his father‘s surname as an unlawful ―classification based on gender‖); 
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222–23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (rejecting an equal protection 
challenge to a statute that required a wife to take her husband‘s surname upon marriage); Jech 
v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.C. Haw. 1979) (―[P]arents have a common law right to give 
their child any name they wish, and . . . the Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from 
arbitrary state action.‖). 
 60. Rosensaft analyzes all of these arguments in depth. See Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 
201–09. 
 61. Id. at 200–01. 
 62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 63. For a discussion of the custom of marital name change, see Emens, supra note 4, at 
770–71. 
 64. Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Name of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 253, 263 
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then interracial marriage statutes—and a host of other discriminatory 
laws—would never have been stricken down.65 
Perhaps, then, preservation of the family unit would be a 
sufficient justification under intermediate scrutiny for disallowing 
men to change their names upon marriage. This argument is based 
upon the idea of the inherent value of name continuity within 
families.
66
 This argument fails for two reasons. First, marrying men 
and women do not have to have the same last name according to 
law.
67
 Second, even if one thinks that a mother, father, and child 
should have the same last name, this fails to explain why that family 
should not be able to choose the mother‘s birth surname as its family 
name. Here, the custom argument intersects; the only way to 
conclude that the father‘s last name is somehow the ―correct‖ one is 
to assert that traditionally the father‘s last name has become the 
family‘s last name. This too would fail under an equal protection 
analysis because no law requires that (1) a family have the same last 
name; (2) the family‘s name be that of the father; or (3) women take 
their husbands‘ last name.68 Additionally, married men have the 
opportunity to change their surnames through a court proceeding.
69
 
While this is certainly more arduous and provides no guarantees, the 
 
(1997). 
 65. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia‘s anti-miscegenation 
statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 66. See Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 201–02. 
 67. Leissner and Rosensaft also assert that the preservation of family unit justification was 
based on the concern that children with different names than their mothers would be considered 
illegitimate and carry that stigma with them. Leissner, supra note 64, at 285; Rosensaft, supra 
note 42, at 201. First, this stigma would not attach if husbands were permitted to take their 
wives‘ last names, because both parents would have the same last name. Rosensaft, supra note 
42, at 201. Second, in contemporary society, it is not uncommon for women and their children 
to have different last names due to divorce, multiple marriages, or independent choice of the 
mothers. Id. at 201–02. Any stigma that might attach to such a difference today would seem to 
be less than that of the past. Id. at 202. 
 68. There are interesting state statutes related to naming children. Jessica R. Powers, Note, 
An Illegitimate Use of Legislative Power: Mississippi’s Inappropriate Child Surname Law in 
Paternity Proceedings, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL‘Y 153 (2004) (criticizing a statute that 
sets a default practice of changing a nonmarital child‘s surname to the father‘s surname 
following establishment of paternity). Some commentators suggest that name-change standards 
and laws for children continue to reflect paternal bias. See generally Merle H. Weiner, ―We Are 
Family”: Valuing Associationalism in Disputes over Children’s Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 
1625, 1735–60 (1997). 
 69. See supra Part I. 
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existence of such an option shows that the government‘s interest in 
preservation of a family unit is not sufficiently related to the lack of 
statutory provision permitting marrying men to change their last 
names. 
Prevention of fraud, in contrast, does seem like a legitimate state 
interest.
70
 In fact, a lack of fraudulent intent is required for a general 
name change petition in all states.
71
 However, prevention of fraud is 
not ―substantially related‖ to the state‘s objective as required by 
intermediate scrutiny. The most obvious argument to the contrary is 
that women already are permitted to change their names upon 
marriage. It is unlikely that men will get married solely to change 
their names and hide their identities.
72
 
Administrative convenience also fails under an intermediate 
scrutiny analysis. This argument has been asserted in child naming 
cases like O’Brien v. Tilson,73 where a federal district court struck 
down a North Carolina statute requiring a child to bear the father‘s 
last name as an illegal ―classification based on gender.‖74 The 
government argued that permitting a child to have a different last 
name would complicate record-keeping of newborns and pose 
difficulties in maintaining accurate health records.
75
 To this the court 
responded: ―In this age of electronic data processing, the Court 
cannot conclude that permitting plaintiffs to do as they wish would 
render it impossible or even minimally more costly or difficult for the 
State . . . to keep track of its new citizens.‖76  
 
 70. Prevention of fraud has been found to be a legitimate state interest. Henne v. Wright, 
904 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (describing prevention of parents‘ ―creation of a false 
implication of paternity‖ as a legitimate state interest).  
 71. See, e.g., the marital name-change statutes of California, Name Equality Act of 2007, 
Cal. Assemb. B. 102 (Oct. 12, 2007); New York, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2003); 
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-20.1 (1996). 
 72. Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 204. 
 73. 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981). 
 74. Id. at 496. The parents in this case wanted to follow the Swedish custom of combining 
the father‘s last name with the suffix ―son.‖ Id. at 495. In this case, the father‘s last name was 
―Arne,‖ and the parents wanted their son‘s last name to be ―Arneson.‖ Id. 
 75. Id. at 496. The court never articulated the standard of review, because ―even under the 
most relaxed of standards . . . the statute proves to be patently defective.‖ Id.  
 76. Id. at 497. 
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In another case, Jech v. Burch,
77
 a mother and father had different 
last names and wanted their child‘s last name to be a combination of 
portions of each parent‘s surname.78 The statute in question required 
a child to have either the father‘s last name, the mother‘s last name, 
or a hyphenated combination of both, and the state argued that the 
parents‘ plan would require the state to change its entire record-
keeping system, which would ―involve[] the expenditure of 
substantial public funds.‖79 The court struck down the statute, holding 
that the state‘s purported interest in administrative convenience failed 
to survive even rational basis review.
80
 As Michael Rosensaft notes, 
―[I]n today‘s technological age, this argument loses even more 
weight, as computerized records can easily be changed and modified 
without significant effort.‖81 Ultimately the only conclusion to draw 
from O’Brien and Jech is that administrative convenience in the 
maintenance of name and health records is not a government interest 
that withstands intermediate scrutiny. 
The government could also assert that the harm suffered by 
marrying men in not having a statutory right equal to that of marrying 
women to change their last names is de minimis. Rosensaft sees three 
potential ways this argument can be advanced: (1) there is in fact no 
injury in not statutorily allowing a husband to take his wife‘s last 
name; (2) the common law permits a husband to change his last name 
to that of his wife; and (3) general name-change statutes permit a 
husband to change his last name to match his wife‘s.82 
First, names are important in our society, and denying marrying 
men the right to change their names in a way identical to marrying 
women is more than a de minimis injury. As Rosensaft puts it, ―[A] 
name is a symbol for one‘s self that carries with it personal identity, 
 
 77. 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Haw. 1979). 
 78. Id. at 715. The mother‘s last name was Jech, the father‘s was Befurt; the desired last 
name for their child was Jebef. Id. 
 79. Id. at 715, 720.  
 80. Id. at 714. The court said the state‘s argument that it would be too difficult to keep 
records was ―ludicrous,‖ because ―[f]or reasons which have still not been explained 
satisfactorily to [this court], the department is completely defeated by the problem of indexing a 
child‘s surname . . . which does not belong to either of the parents.‖ Id. at 718, 720. 
 81. See Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 203. 
 82. See id. at 205. 
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familial ties, and ethnic history.‖83 Parents spend significant portions 
of time carefully choosing names for children. Feminist activists have 
long fought against requirements forcing a married woman to change 
her last name.
84
 Nazi Germany forced Jewish persons to take specific 
middle names if their original names were not ―Jewish enough‖ so 
that the Jews were readily identifiable.
85
 The power to name matters. 
The denial of the right to control one‘s name is not de minimis.86 
Second, although most states do recognize a common law right to 
change one‘s name through usage, the common law right to use that 
name is practically useless in modern society unless the couple hopes 
to avoid taxes or intends to live without valid driver licenses or credit 
cards.
87
 The common law right does not provide the kind of official 
documentation of name-change required for modern activities.
88
 The 
potential to change one‘s name through common law is so 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. ―I guarantee you that the first generation of women who grow up without scribbling 
‗Mrs. Paul Newman‘ all over their notebooks ‗just to see what it looks like‘ is going to think 
[the feminists who fought against mandatory name change for women] were mad. It is a very 
odd and radical idea indeed that a woman would nominally disappear just because she got 
married.‖ Emens, supra note 4, at 767. 
 85. Robert M. Rennick, The Nazi Name Decrees of the Nineteen Thirties, 18 NAMES 65, 
76, 80 (1970) (noting that Jewish males were required to take the middle name ―Israel‖ and 
Jewish women to take the middle name ―Sarah‖). 
 86. The first known American woman to retain her birth name after marriage was Lucy 
Stone (1818–1893), an American suffragist and anti-slavery advocate who campaigned for 
equality and name choice freedom. Lucy Stone League, http://www.lucystoneleague.org/lucy. 
html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). In her honor, the Lucy Stone League was formed in the 1920s, 
dedicated toward equal naming rights and more general feminist aims. Lucy Stone League, 
Who Are We?, http://www.lucystoneleague.org/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). The Lucy Stone 
league was the predecessor to the modern-day National Organization for Women (―NOW‖). 
Leissner, supra note 32, at 389. 
 87. Oklahoma made statutory name change procedures exclusive in Sneed v. Sneed, 585 
P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okla. 1978). For this state, the ―common law name-change being useless‖ 
argument is not applicable. For all the states, however, ―[t]he realities of contemporary society 
requires [sic] a state-sponsored corroboration to establish our identity.‖ Rosensaft, supra note 
42, at 206. For example, ―[b]anks and any other financial institutions must have some concrete 
evidence of name change.‖ Id. at 206 n.111. 
 88. Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 206. As the California Attorney General put it,  
the inability to establish one‘s name for purposes of life‘s daily transactions, although 
perhaps only occasionally resulting when sole reliance is placed on the common law 
method, can be a substantial inconvenience when it occurs. Such are the circumstances 
in which one may be led to question the ―validity‖ of a common law change of a name. 
83 Op. Cal. Att‘y Gen. 00-205, 3 (2000). 
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impractical that the injury suffered by men lacking a statutory right is 
not de minimis.
89
 
Third, whereas it is a woman‘s statutory right to change her last 
name upon marriage, a man must go through a court proceeding in 
order to achieve the same result.
90
 Such a proceeding is more costly, 
time-consuming, and does not even guarantee results, as judges have 
large discretion in determining if such a name-change is granted.
91
 It 
can cost hundreds of dollars to go to court to change one‘s name, 
including court and attorney fees.
92
 Furthermore, many states give the 
judge full discretion to decide whether to permit a name change.
93
 It 
is entirely possible that a particular judge might think it improper for 
a husband to adopt his wife‘s surname. Marrying women, on the 
other hand, do not go through any of this. Such added expense and 
uncertainty is more than de minimis injury for marrying men. 
B. Why a Majority of Marrying Women Adopt the Last Names of 
Their Husbands 
People‘s proffered reasons for changing or keeping their last 
names vary widely. While there are often multiple reasons for such a 
decision,
94
 there seem to be three general explanations for why most 
marrying women change their surnames: (1) name change is the 
 
 89. Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 206. 
 90. Id. at 207–08. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. §§ 1277–78 (2006), previously requiring court fees in excess 
of $300 for a name change petition. Currently in Nueces County, Texas, the court costs for an 
adult name change are $226. Court Cost Fees Effective Jan. 1, 2008, at 2, http://www.co. 
nueces.tx.us/districtclerk/pdf/civil_filing_fees.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). Sometimes the 
additional cost of a newspaper advertisement must be included. See Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 
208. In Colorado, for example, a person changing his or her name must give notice in a local 
newspaper ―at least three times . . . within twenty days after the court orders publication.‖ 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-15-102 (2008). 
 93. Rosensaft, supra note 42, at 208. In Washington, for example, a court has full 
discretion in deciding whether to accept a name change. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.130 (2007). 
 94. For example, a religiously oriented Christian website cites three reasons for which a 
bride should take a groom‘s last name: (1) protection of family and wealth; (2) designation of a 
new life direction; and (3) acknowledgement of God‘s presence and endorsement of marriage. 
Laura Dawn Lewis, Why Brides Change Last Names, Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.couples 
company.com/Features/ChangeName.htm. It is unclear why these should explain a woman‘s 
choice to change her name, but not a man‘s.  
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assumption when women do not question their options; (2) social 
pressures; and (3) bureaucratic pressures. All three are interrelated, 
and also could explain why marrying men keep their surnames. 
First, the assumption explanation relates to the fact that women 
grow up with the expectation of changing their names upon marriage, 
and men do not.
95
 Girls are generally raised with the assumption that 
they will grow up, marry, and become ―Mrs. His Name,‖ instead of 
keeping their birth names.
96
 This is likely reinforced through the 
media, by parents, and through everyday experiences with adults.
97
 
Additionally, if a question such as ―Are you changing your name?‖ is 
ever asked of a betrothed person, the question is inevitably directed 
toward the woman.
98
 Doubtless this is because it is so widely 
 
 95. See Emens, supra note 4, at 775–80. ―Imagine two people. One grew up knowing 
from a young age that his name is his to keep, and that it won‘t change by virtue of his 
relationships. . . . The second person grew up knowing from a young age that her name would 
disappear and be replaced by another name, if and only if she were lucky enough to be loved 
enough to be given a new name.‖ Id. at 778. 
 96. See id. at 776–78. ―With new boys she met, she scribbled out her new name and 
dreamily imagined herself as Mrs. Somebody Else.‖ Id. at 778. 
 97. Common experience tells us that many children have parents and encounter other 
married adults with the same last name, the woman having changed hers. Only 10% of married 
women in the U.S. have as their last names their own birthnames or any name other than their 
husbands‘ birthnames. See Brightman, supra note 23 and accompanying text. It is difficult to 
say how reliable these numbers are—another study shows that fewer than 5% of women over 
two generations did anything other than take their husbands‘ name at marriage, though that 
study excluded women who divorced during that time frame. See Scheuble & Johnson, supra 
note 23, at 727. Given the general agreement of these studies that the vast majority of marrying 
women take their husbands‘ last names, it is reasonable to conclude that most girls grow up 
with mothers who took the girls‘ father‘s (or some other man‘s) last name, and that other adult 
married women they encounter generally have their husbands‘ last names. 
 98. See Emens, supra note 4, at 775. Note also the New York Times wedding pages‘ 
traditional practice of notice, as the marked answer to an implied question, ―the bride will be 
keeping her name.‖ Id. Answers depend upon the question asked, but the question is rarely 
asked of men. Performing a simple Google Scholar search for studies of name change upon 
marriage reveals that the vast majority of such studies deal with women‘s choices, not men‘s. 
See, e.g., Penelope Wasson Dralle & Kathelynne Mackiewicz, Psychological Impact of 
Women’s Name Change at Marriage: Literature Review and Implications for Further Study, 
AM. J. FAM. THERAPY, Fall 1981, at 50–55, available at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ 
content~content=a779557148~db=all. Performing a second Google search trying to find articles 
discussing whether people should change their name upon marriage similarly reveals that nearly 
all such articles are directed toward women. See, e.g., Sheri and Bob Stritof, Changing Your 
Name After Marriage, ABOUT.COM, http://marriage.about.com/cs/namechange/a/namechange. 
htm (dealing ostensibly in a gender-neutral way with marital name change, but referring only to 
females: ―It is not unusual today for a woman to keep her maiden name professionally, and to 
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accepted that marrying men keep their surnames and marrying 
women may not. The assumptions with which girls grow up and the 
way that questions about name-change are asked mean that a woman 
may never question whether she will change her last name upon 
marriage, making her name change a foregone conclusion. And if she 
does question her options, the second factor—social pressure—may 
nonetheless intervene. 
Social pressure is closely intertwined with the ―default‖ reason. 
The two explain each other: marrying women may not ask 
themselves whether they wish to change their surname largely 
because of the social norm not to change their surnames; this social 
norm is supported by history; and social pressures abound to 
reinforce the norm. At the same time, the social pressures for women 
to keep their names upon marriage exist because women do not 
question the deeply-ingrained norm.  
There are many kinds of social pressures urging women to change 
their surnames upon marriage, including history, tradition, and 
religion.
99
 Additionally, women are concerned about the continuity of 
family name, both over generations and within the family.
100
 
Moreover, there are social judgments and pressures to simply comply 
in with the norm.
101
  
As for tradition, doing something simply because it is how it has 
been done in the past does not mean that it is the best way—or 
constitutional.
102
 People and times evolve, and following tradition for 
 
use her married name socially. Whether or not to change names is one of the first decisions a 
couple needs to make.‖). 
 99. For an example of religious pressure, see supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 100. Emens discusses continuity as a factor to consider in contemplating marital name 
changes and in determining whether a new system of ―biphenation‖ could help solve the 
continuity issue. See generally Emens, supra note 4. 
 101. ―Social meanings act to induce actions in accordance with social norms, and thereby 
impose costs on efforts to transform social norms.‖ Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 998 (1995). For a study of judgments made against those who 
are outside of a social category, see Penelope Oaks & John C. Turner, Distinctiveness and the 
Salience of Social Category Memberships: Is There an Automatic Perceptual Bias Towards 
Novelty?, 16 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 325 (1986). 
 102. Similarly, ―a history or tradition of discrimination—no matter how entrenched—does 
not make the discrimination constitutional.‖ Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 33 (N.Y. 
2006). 
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tradition‘s sake is unavailing in light of modern conceptions of 
equality, the importance of names, and personal autonomy. 
Continuity of a family‘s last name over time and within the family 
is a concern because many people want to be connected to their 
family histories and share a name with their relatives and immediate 
family members.
103
 Of course, this fails to answer the question of 
why the inherited name should be the man‘s. Women have as much 
family history as men, and consistently choosing the man‘s last name 
respects only half of the family tree.  
Beyond family history, additional forces inform name choice—or 
lack thereof. Peer judgment and pressures are very real concerns. By 
and large, people want to be ―normal,‖ and do not want the hassle of 
explaining something out of the norm.
104
 If most women change their 
names upon marriage, it can create an uncomfortable social situation 
for those who do not. Of course, it is not only marrying women who 
are affected by community judgment; women who already have been 
married may advocate this norm to others so that they themselves are 
not judged for being ―behind the times‖ or unenlightened.105 
Finally, there are great bureaucratic pressures for women to 
change their names upon marriage. First, in most states, it is easier 
for women to change their last names than for men to do so.
106
 Most 
laws are designed for women to alter their surnames, and not vice 
versa.
107
 Again, this is closely intertwined with the other two 
explanations: the legal framework informs the social atmosphere and 
contributes to the assumptions that a woman will change her last 
name upon marriage, and vice versa. 
 
 103. See generally Emens, supra note 4. 
 104. See Lessig, supra note 101, at 998; Oaks & Turner, supra note 101, at 325–44. 
 105. Many people have strong feelings about marrying women changing their names. For 
example, ―I'm afraid that women who change their names are blindly promoting women as 
second-class persons, though I suspect that they themselves don't think they are doing this. . . . 
To me the difference is whether the woman thought about the choice—just blindly doing 
anything is not acceptable.‖ Tammy Jo Eckhart, The Choice and Power of Surnames, SISTER, 
1996–97, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sister/Surnames.html. During a talk on her article, 
Changing Name Changing, Emens was asked ―‗Do you judge women who make some naming 
choices rather than others?‘‖ Emens, supra note 4, at 766. This exchange shows that at least 
some women harbor concerns over being judged for changing their names. 
 106. See Emens, supra note 4, at 809–23 (describing the legal defaults for men and women, 
and the processes for women and men to change their names upon marriage). 
 107. Id. 
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C. The Effect of a Lack of Statutory Authority for Marrying Men to 
Change Their Surnames and Its Effects on Marrying Women’s 
“Choice” of Surname 
The assumptions, social pressures, and bureaucratic pressures that 
influence women and men regarding their marital surnames are not 
independent. The lack of statutory authority for marrying men to 
change their surnames necessarily affects marrying women‘s 
―choice‖ of surnames. For a couple that has decided that, despite the 
contrary social pressures and assumptions, the husband will change 
his name upon marriage, the fact that the laws are structured to 
discourage such a result can have the ultimate effect of preventing a 
man‘s name change.108 Even if a marrying man wants to change his 
last name despite the hurdles, such a result is not assured when his 
only recourse is a court order that lies within the discretion of a 
judge.
109
 If a marrying couple wishes to share a last name, or wishes 
to share a last name with any potential children, the relative 
simplicity of a woman changing her last name will be more attractive 
and thus the more likely outcome.  
Because women have the ability to either keep their last names or 
statutorily change them upon marriage, it is easy to say that they have 
a choice in the matter. However, the combination of social pressures, 
assumptions, and bureaucratic pressures make this ―choice‖ more like 
a foregone conclusion. The fact that men are denied equal protection 
by not having a statutory right to change their name is one of many 
factors diminishing women‘s choice and personal agency in 
determining their last names upon marriage. The same could be said 
for men and their ―choice‖ in surname. 
This matters because the choice of something as important as a 
name should be based on rational, individual goals and reasons, 
 
 108. Even for the stout of heart, obtaining a name change can be costly. Consider Michael 
Buday of California, who wanted to take his wife‘s last name. See First Amended Complaint 
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, ¶ 16, Buday v. California, No. 2:06-CV-08008, 2007 
DOCK-CA-CDCT WL (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006). The couple tried to fill out paperwork that a 
marrying woman would fill out to effect a name change, but the state government would not 
permit it. Id. ¶¶ 15–27. Refusing to go through the process and expense of a court order, Buday 
brought suit, alleging that differently worded forms constituted systematic sex-based 
classification in derogation of equal protection. Id. ¶¶ 28–31.  
 109. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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instead of social norms, assumptions, and bureaucratic barriers. Such 
choice is especially important for women because of the historical 
context: upon marriage, wives‘ identities were originally completely 
eclipsed by their husbands‘, and women have historically been placed 
in positions subservient to men.
110
 While the underlying attitudes 
have undergone great change, giving women a true choice in their 
selection of surnames recognizes them as fully independent, equal 
persons. 
III. PROPOSAL 
Attaining truly equal treatment of men and women as independent 
and equal persons is not simple. A start would be to recognize men‘s 
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by giving 
them the statutory right to change their last name upon marriage in all 
fifty states. 
Men have such statutory rights in eight states,
111
 and the text from 
those statutes, especially those of New York and California, is a 
helpful template for other states.
112
 For example, New York Domestic 
Relations Law § 15 requires marriage license application forms to 
inform prospective spouses ―that neither of them must change their 
names, that either can, and that there are a range of naming options 
available to them.‖113  
There are minor ways that the statute could be improved. As 
Professor Emens suggests, the ―information about the bride and 
groom, and their parents, should be asked in ways that do not subtly 
assert inegalitarian social conventions.‖114 For example, instead of 
requesting the ―father‘s name‖ and the ―mother‘s maiden name,‖ the 
form should ask for each parent‘s ―name‖ and ―birth name (if 
different).‖115 Such a change in forms would undoubtedly have an 
impact on the social assumptions and pressures faced by marrying 
 
 110. See supra INTRODUCTION.  
 111. Those states are California, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New 
York, and North Dakota. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 113. Emens, supra note 4, at 856; see supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 114. Emens, supra note 4, at 857. 
 115. Id.  
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men and women regarding name change.
116
 Small-scale changes such 
as this would ease the transition to a more equal society by removing 
one bureaucratic obstacle; however, the existence of a statutory right 
for men to change their last names upon marriage in all states is a 
necessary precondition, and one mandated by the Constitution. In 
enacting such legislation, the remaining forty-two states should pay 
careful attention to the word choice and framing of the statute so as to 
maximize equality among all citizens.
117
 
CONCLUSION 
Men are denied equal protection under the laws by not being 
granted a statutory right to change their last names upon marriage. 
Marrying men possess such a right in only eight states; in the 
remaining forty-two, men must obtain a court order to change their 
surnames and pay potentially hundreds of dollars in court costs and 
attorney‘s fees. The increased difficulty marrying men face in 
adopting a different surname, combined with the pervasive social 
customs of husbands keeping their surnames and wives changing 
theirs, and the desire of many married couples to share a last name, 
has two main effects: fewer men change their names upon marriage, 
and fewer women keep their surnames upon marriage. This makes 
name change less of a ―choice‖ for both men and women and more of 
a forced decision. Adoption of statutes granting truly equal 
opportunities for men and women to change their last names upon 
marriage would result in greater personal agency in the choice of a 
name.  
The ability to choose one‘s name is an important indicator of 
individual independence and self-identity. This is especially 
important for women in light of historical discrimination and 
coverture. Women have been considered subservient to the desires 
and will of men in the past, and it is important to recognize women‘s 
independent desires and personhoods. This is not to say that a wife 
taking her husband‘s last name indicates that the wife is somehow 
 
 116. See id. at 854–59 (addressing the impact of social and legal defaults, including 
framing, forced choosing, and desk-clerk law on a person‘s choice of last name upon marriage). 
 117. Id. 
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less of a person. Rather, such a choice should truly be a choice and 
not a product of legislative and social constraints based on an 
antiquated conception of women as second-class citizens. Such 
legislative and social constraints are a form of institutional sexism, 
negatively affecting the individual personhood of both men and 
women. 
Changing state statutes will not create immediate equality 
between men and women. But laws affect society, and if name 
changing statutes are altered to present equal opportunities for 
husbands and wives, the general population may begin to embrace 
that ideal. Giving marrying men the right to change their last names 
is but a small and justified step toward respecting women and men as 
equals. 
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